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Introduction 
In the last four decades or so, governments and governmental bodies in ‘western’ countries 
have come under increasing pressure, both societal and financial in nature. The quest for effi-
ciency, efficacy, responsiveness, flexibility and accountability of government is a dominant 
one. As outlined in the introductory chapter, this has given rise to numerous innovations both 
in public organization and in policymaking and implementation. These innovations aimed at 
improving government in some respects in order to accommodate ‘external’ and ‘internal’ 
pressures. 
 Not all these innovations are considered successful. Some are replaced by others 
within a few years time, in which case a change of direction (e.g. on a centralization – decen-
tralization dimension) is not uncommon (Pollit and Bouckaert 2000: 149-152). In other cases 
innovations are supplemented with other ones, e.g. autonomization followed by a growing 
intensity of central control (Bekkers 1998; Van Thiel and Pollitt, this volume, chapter 4). On 
the other hand there are successes, at least in the eyes of some actors involved (see Pollitt in 
chapter 2 and Kickert in chapter 3, this volume). Such ‘best practices’, however, may be cop-
ied elsewhere with mixed results (e.g. Hakvoort and Klaassen, this volume, chapter 7). More-
over authorities and agencies are frequently criticized (e.g. in cases of a disaster) for proce-
dures and practices they have taken for granted for long. It may be concluded that – although 
many procedures and innovations are considered ‘necessary’ and ‘unavoidable’ – not enough 
is known about their working and impact (Cf. Teisman and Van Buren in chapter 11 of this 
volume). 
In this chapter I will discuss what evaluation does and can contribute to insight in the 
dynamics and effects of (new) public management reforms. To do so, I pose three key ques-
tions: 
1. How is evaluation actually applied in relation to NPM-reforms? 
2. How are evaluation results used and how can their impact be understood? 
3. How can evaluations in and of NPM-reforms be improved? 
The theoretical framework that I will present to help answering the second question will also 
be used to explain the state of affairs in relation to the first question. Moreover, it will be 
used, in combination with empirical observations to support the conclusions with respect to 
question 3.  
 Before going into the three questions in turn I present some observations on the 
broader context of reforms in the public domain. In my view this is relevant for the present 
subject, because evaluation of specific measures or of specific (classes of) reforms should 
take into account relevant boundary conditions and goals or requirements that are not explic-
itly included in the focal measures. 
 
Challenges for public management 
NPM-type reforms in the public domain are quite widespread (Kickert 1997; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000). Although the label NPM refers to a rather heterogeneous set of innovations 
and practices (see chapter 1),  it can be said to comprise the utilization of private sector man-
agement techniques and organizational forms in the public sector. NPM innovations seek to 
improve efficiency and quality of public administration and service delivery by decentral 
autonomy and output control, frequently regulated by management contracts. The underlying 
rationale seems to be that an incentive structure that rewards efficient production and measur-
able output enhances motivation and creativity of individuals and groups and can replace 
much efficiency reducing hierarchical control. Moreover the decentralized nature of the new 
arrangements is thought to enhance flexibility, responsiveness and tailor-made solutions: a 
demand orientation, which is presupposed to be the main guide of private sector management. 
Taken together NPM reforms are expected to trigger a better use of public sector resources. 
 NPM reforms are by no means the only type of reforms with which public and semi-
public agencies are occupied. Nor is the underlying rationale of NPM the only rationale about 
improvement in the public domain. A second type of innovation focuses not so much on gov-
ernment or public sector production per se but on joint production of policies, public works 
and services with private sector enterprises and/or societal organizations (Teisman and Ver-
heij 1996; Tops and Weterings 1998). The aims are in a sense similar to those of NPM inno-
vations, viz. improving efficiency and quality of public production. But here (semi-)public 
agencies are not the sole producers. Here too, there is a parallel with private sector strategies, 
where organizations initiate joint enterprises to realize projects, develop new technology or 
penetrate new markets. The main rationale, however, is quite different from the NPM type. 
The problem is not that the public sector uses its resources in a sub-optimal way, but that 
government lacks key knowledge, financial and other resources to realize many projects and 
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solutions to societal problems. Government is only one among many actors in a societal net-
work of interdependencies. Only by cooperation effective results can be hoped for. 
 A third set of new strategies in public management seeks to involve citizens and so-
cietal organizations having an interest in certain policy issues or domains. This participation 
(Edelenbos 2000) may include the phase of problem definition, generation of possible solu-
tions, a role of citizens and societal organizations in policy implementation and evaluation, 
and a shift in responsibility towards the citizens or private initiative. By definition there is 
some overlap with the second type op public management innovations since here too, non-
governmental actors are involved in the production of policy and policy outcomes. However, 
there are other rationales for such participative strategies. One of them starts from the notion 
that societal problems often cannot be identified in an objective and unambiguous way. The 
public task, then, is not so much to solve ‘the’ problem, but to search for ways to accommo-
date different problem definitions at the same time (Teisman and Verheij 1996). By involving 
individuals and groups having an interest in at least some of these definitions, the searching 
process is part of its solution. In and by interaction with other actors (among which govern-
mental ones) actors may change or broaden their problem definitions and/or come to conceive 
of new solutions. Thus, eventual outcomes may in part be created by and gain the support of 
stakeholders. The role of government is mainly a facilitating one in producing solutions and 
support  (De Bruijn et al. 1998).  
Now, it is important to notice that these different rationales and steering practices, as 
well as classical hierarchical approaches are applied simultaneously, often by the same actors, 
sometimes within a single policy initiative.1 Thus, is not only worthwhile to ask how success-
ful individual public management innovations are and how valid their rationales are but it is 
also interesting to see how different types of reforms influence each other and how their ra-
tionales interact in practice, for these interaction influence behaviors and outcomes. There-
fore, evaluation should take account of them. 
 
Evaluation as instrument in NPM practices 
In the framework of NPM-like innovations evaluations play an important role. Assessment of 
performance or output and comparing it to initial targets or contractual commitments is cen-
                                                     
1 For example, in the new Dutch law on care (‘Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning’) all four ration-
ales can be found: 
• hierarchy: the municipalities are made responsible by law for societal care 
• co-production: care should be delivered as much as possible by private organizations 
• participation: care clients should participate in formulating care policies; clients should take re-
sponsibility for organizing their own care as much as possible 
• new public management: care delivering organizations are contracted and evaluated according to 
agreed performance measures 
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tral to the philosophy of this type of approach. Moreover, the felt need for public accountabil-
ity of (autonomized) agencies has given rise to numerous review procedures and control 
mechanisms, which also involve the collection and judgment of data on performance and re-
sults (see e.g. Sanderson 2001, who describes local practices in the UK). Such practices con-
tribute to an ‘evaluative state’ (Sanderson 2001: 303) or ‘audit explosion’ (Power, 1994) in 
which performance measurement and accountability constitute the dominant perspective (see 
e.g. this volume, chapter 4). 
Although there are differences between countries with respect to the quantity and 
specific characteristics of performance evaluations (e.g. Christensen et al 2003), there is a 
clear tendency, at least in the Anglo-Saxon and Northern European world towards more and 
more quantitative performance assessments. This holds both for ‘internal’ management re-
ports and external audits (Pollitt et al. 1999; Wollmann 2003). 
 
With respect to the utilization and impact of these evaluations four observations can be made. 
 First, they influence and direct actual behavior. Since performance indicators gener-
ally are known before the actual performance takes place, they can and will guide this per-
formance (Van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002). If the performance of academic work is assessed by 
counting the number of publication in international refereed journals, the number of such pub-
lications and the time devoted to producing them will rise. In a sense, the impact precedes the 
actual evaluation. But there are also ex post impacts as for example the allocation of new 
budgets is based on evaluation results: consecutive action is constrained or enhanced or redi-
rected by such reallocations. 
 Second, this type of evaluations may give rise to unintended or perverse effects. This 
is a consequence of the fact that performance indicators used generally are only partial opera-
tionalizations or proxies of the goals aimed at. This phenomenon is known as the performance 
paradox (Meyer and Gupta 1994; Van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002).  
 Third, frequently, especially in the relation between ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ the 
amount and the specificity of data produced by agents are so large that their impact is greatly 
reduced by the overload or ambiguity it creates for the principal (Hazeu 2000). The steering 
capacity of the principal may actually be reduced by the massive introduction of performance 
data. 
 Finally, the fact that evaluations in this context focus on accountability may produce 
‘defensive’ reactions by evaluated units in the sense of denying the validity of evaluation out-
comes or seeking excuses beyond control (Sanderson, 2001; Teisman and Van der Meer 
2002). Such reactions reduce the opportunities for learning since the question of possible im-
provements is evaded. 
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Evaluation of NPM reforms 
In view of the impressive amount of evaluations produced in relation to NPM-like manage-
ment, it is remarkable that NPM-reforms as such, including the evaluation procedures in-
volved, are evaluated far less systematically (Pollitt 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2003; Forbes 
and Lynn 2005). Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) observe much resistance in UK government 
towards such evaluations, for budgetary and other reasons. Still, in the meantime there have 
appeared a number of studies. The edited volume by Wollmann (2003) gives an impression, 
although it is not always clear whether its reviews pertain to evaluation as an instrument 
within NPM or to evaluation of the reforms as such. In part this can be excused for it should 
be noted that there is no sharp demarcation between these two categories of evaluation.  
There appears to be a grey zone in between in which NPM reforms are evaluated 
within the logic of NPM itself. For example, the success of a reform may be measured by the 
extent to which performance data are produced, and not so much by a related increase in effi-
ciency or responsiveness. In part this may be due to methodical problems such as a poor 
measurability, or lacking ex ante data. But even apart from that there often seems to be a re-
markable inclination, especially in audit institutions, to focus on administrative control and 
documentation in stead of on eventual results. 
A study by Boyne et al. (2003) is interesting, not only because it tries to assess in-
tended outcomes of public management innovations in the British education, health care and 
housing sectors, but also because it devotes attention to unintended effects with respect to eq-
uity. Interestingly, this last variable appears to be the only one with an unequivocal, and nega-
tive, result. Broad and open evaluations like this one seem to be the exception rather than the 
rule.  
 
Dynamics of evaluation 
After this rough sketch of practices of NPM evaluation, I now venture into a theoretical re-
flection about why evaluation practices are shaped in the way they are, when, why and how 
their results are used and how their impacts are generated. Next, I will use this theoretical 
framework to contribute to an understanding of the dynamics of evaluation in and of NPM 
(see boxes) and to develop ideas for its improvement (see following sections).  
 
I propose to view evaluation in terms of sensemaking processes (Weick 1979, 1995). The 
simple and somewhat naive argument to justify this approach is that evaluation aims at sen-
semaking. It is about assessing what is or has been going on, how this has come about, how 
the findings have to be valued and about how we might think of possible improvements. But, 
although the previous sentence may reflect the ambition of evaluators and/or their principals, 
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we should realize that it may not be shared by all actors involved in the evaluation process. 
Some may see it as an irrelevant time and money consuming bureaucratic practice or as a 
threat to their autonomy or professional discretion. Some may loyally contribute data but not 
hope or intend to learn something from it. However, these other actors are still engaged in 
sensemaking. They attach meaning to the evaluation process and its outcomes. For our pre-
sent purpose this is not interesting in itself. The key argument for viewing the dynamics of 
evaluation in terms of sensemaking processes is the thesis that the interplay of the different 
sensemaking processes in the actions and interactions of actors determine the shape, the out-
come and the impact of evaluations. I will elaborate this thesis in a number of steps below.  
 
First, in the stage of initiating an evaluation a large number of choices are made by commis-
sioners and evaluators. Amongst these are substantive choices, such as: What exactly is to be 
evaluated? Which criteria are to be used? Which types of data are required? There are also 
methodological choices: How are data to be collected? How are they to be interpreted and 
related to each other? Finally, there are organizational or administrative choices: Who is to 
perform the evaluation? Who are to be involved in what roles? Who should take cognizance 
of the results and act upon them?  
 How are such choices, which constitute the ‘script’ for the evaluation, made? Pre-
sumably they are the result of interactions (consultation, negotiation) between the actors in-
volved in this stage. This interaction takes place in the context of already existing frames of 
meaning and patterns of practice. I call such patterns of thinking and acting repertoires (Van 
der Meer 1999; Van der Meer et al. 2000). To the extent in which there is consensus among 
the actors involved, the definition of the evaluation will reflect the common repertoire. Where 
there is dissensus, negotiation, compromise and  use of ‘power’ will come about, often result-
ing in vague or ambiguous formulations. But even then, the resulting design reflects sense-
making form repertoires. Agreement is reached by means of (implicit) answers that actors 
give to questions like: What is acceptable? What are driving forces? What opportunities are 
left for influence or manipulation in a later stage? Thus, sensemaking in interaction gives 
shape to the evaluation. 
 
Commissioners of NPM related evaluations, who frequently are co-initiators or sponsors of 
the reform, and the evaluators they hire generally will have a strong believe in the rationale 
behind NPM reforms. Therefore, in thinking about evaluation they will for example tend to 
start with the idea that a result-oriented structure will evoke maximal motivation and produc-
tivity (both quantitative and qualitative). Thus, in their view evaluation should assess results 
and measure these in terms of success or accordance to preset goals. The agent should then be 
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rewarded accordingly. Within the NPM rationale this argument with respect to evaluation 
seems to be self-evident. From this perspective there is little reason to doubt the rationale it-
self, which may explain why NPM reforms are seldom explicitly evaluated. And when they 
are, evaluations tend to focus on the extent to which organizations involved bring NPM pro-
cedures and provisions into practice and far less on what the eventual impacts of the reforms 
are.  
 
Second, in carrying out an evaluation,  again sensemaking and interaction take place. In this 
stage typically other actors become involved. Often commissioners will be involved less, but 
others, such as managers and other personnel of evaluated units, clients, citizens, partners, etc. 
are interviewed, are requested or required to produce data, or are even asked for their own 
opinions and assessments as in participative or responsive evaluation (Abma 1996; Taket and 
White 1997; Ryan and DiStefano 2001). Obviously, these new actors have to make sense of 
what is asked of them, even if they take the evaluation for granted and adopt an a priori posi-
tive attitude. They do so by utilizing their own repertoire, which may differ considerably from 
the repertoire of the initiators of the evaluation. Moreover, the new actors will also make 
sense of the evaluation as such: What are its aims? How valid will the results be? What con-
sequences may the results have? This sensemaking will of course influence their responses. 
This may be called ‘strategic’ behavior, as long as that is not synonymous with disloyality. It 
is clear from this argument that the evaluation is considerably influenced by sensemaking 
processes in this stage. It might even be said that the evaluation often is redefined during its 
course.2
 
Professional employees in a unit involved in some sort of contract may make – from their 
professional perspective - a rather sharp distinction between the quantified output criteria 
mentioned in the contract and ‘real’ quality, which is hard to measure. If so, they may con-
sider it fully legitimate to score on the output criteria as quickly and artificially as possible in 
order to safe time for the real thing or to induce an ‘accurate’ evaluation although the indica-
tors are invalid from a professional point of view (Green, 1999).  
 Also, managers of agencies will have their own impressions and make their own as-
sessments of the functioning of their organization and its efficacy. These images may not 
fully correspond to the picture that emerges from the data to be included in the evaluation, 
for example because the evaluation data do not reflect relevant changes in external condi-
tions as they are experienced and interpreted by the manager. This may trigger the manager 
to provide additional data, to present data in other ways, or to supply extensive comments to 
                                                     
2 Cf. Dawson (1996, 233-262) who makes a similar analysis of the implementation of planned change 
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the data. However, he may also refrain from such actions if he fears that these will be inter-
preted as defensive window dressing by the principal. 
 
A third step in my theoretical argument is about the impact of evaluations (Cf. Van der Meer 
1999). Here again the notion of sensemaking plays a key role. The influence of evaluations 
and evaluation results on actual behavior (talking, rewarding, changing, acting) is determined 
by how they are interpreted and valued by actors involved. Besides that, the influence of 
evaluation on actual administrative and organizational behavior depends on the way its out-
comes become embedded in the web of other factors influencing this behavior (Weiss 1990) 
It is important to note that in this stage generally there are far more actors involved than those 
who commissioned the evaluation. Although the latter may sometimes have the power to 
make decisions with respect to tasks, personnel, budgets, rewards, or organizational structures 
and procedures, they are by no means the only actors whose sensemaking matters. I have al-
ready pointed to the possibility that evaluation evokes perverse effects or defensive reactions 
if that seems to be useful or self-evident from the perspective of evaluated actors.3 Moreover, 
evaluated actors may try to ‘improve’ their actions in anticipation of or reaction to evaluation. 
The way in which they proceed in this connection will again depend on how they interpret 
both their own behavior and the evaluation and its outcomes. Finally, also the commissioners 
of the evaluation or those with formal power to make decisions on its consequences have to 
make sense of the evaluation results – explicitly or implicitly  - before they can act upon it.  
 
In NPM contexts evaluations frequently focus on performance measurement and comparing 
quantified results with ex ante targets  so as to enable accountability. Thus, evaluations may 
lead to reallocation of budgets or revision of contracts. These attributes may well have quite 
different meanings for the actors involved.4  
 A typical principal might feel the evaluation gives him control and enables him to 
bear an overall responsibility without the necessity of going into implementations details. He 
may, furthermore, feel secure even if he does not fully understand the details of the evalua-
tion, because he holds a strong believe in the rationales behind NPM. The general picture of 
success or failure suffices (cf. the fact that surveillance is often delegated to independent 
overseeing bodies). Sensemaking and consecutive action seem straightforward, although addi-
tional information supplied (see previous box) may cause some equivocality. But if 84,7% of 
                                                     
3 In fact, the labels ‘perverse’ and ‘defensive’ are interpretations and valuations based on sensemaking 
processes themselves. There are few actors considering themselves perverse or defensive. This pre-
cisely exemplifies the diversity of sensemaking in these processes. 
4 Cf. Schein 1996 on typical differences in ‘culture’ between operators, technicians and managers, 
linked to their tasks, knowledge and position. 
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Dutch passenger trains are ‘in time’, while the contract required 86,5%, that’s a failure. 
 For a manager of an implementing agency the evaluation results may be far more 
ambiguous. He may have doubts about the validity of the results, he has to think of explana-
tions and he needs to invent internal measures and external strategies to deal with the situation 
shown or induced by the evaluation. In this sensemaking and strategy development process 
there is far more at stake than the straightforward comparison of targets and realization. It 
determines to a large extent how the organization will ‘learn’ from the evaluation, but it also 
determines the negotiation strategy with the principal, which may eventually influence the 
decisions the latter will take. 
 Professional employees are often in a position in which they do not need to react di-
rectly to evaluation outcomes. However, they are confronted with possible management 
measures. Their assessment of the validity and relevance of the evaluation and of the sensibil-
ity and force of the management measures will influence their behavior. They may feel forced 
to ‘conform’, although perhaps in ‘perverse’ ways, or they may feel their professional status 
and factual autonomy is large enough to virtually negate the evaluation results and/or the 
management measures. Also, if their ‘results’ are successful, this may enhance their immunity 
from critique in later episodes.  
 
A following theoretical idea connecting the dynamics of evaluation processes to sensemaking 
and interaction is that third actors play a role. Evaluation is not a sensemaking process that 
takes place in isolation between principal and agent or between evaluator and evaluated, but 
in a context full of other actors, such as competitors, clients, citizens, interest groups, parlia-
ment, press, etc. Such actors may formally or informally influence the focus or criteria used in 
evaluations. They may also react to evaluations (or their divers follow-ups). If these third ac-
tors (are considered to) have power or are thought of as ‘important’ by the focal actors, their 
reactions may contribute to an indirect influence evaluations may have on these focal actors. 
Moreover third actors may adapt their own behavior on the basis of their interpretation of 
evaluation outcomes.  
 
Suppose, some targets are set for the personal safety policy in a certain neighborhood and an 
evaluation report shows that safety has increased, while at the same time many inhabitants of 
the neighborhood feel less secure than they did a year ago. They may protest and seek media 
coverage for their problems. Or they may realize that they can influence (i.e. make more real-
istic from their point of view) performance indicators, e.g. by reporting incidents more fre-
quently to the police. The first reaction may for example trigger a decision to include subjec-
tive experience of inhabitants in next year’s performance review (as is actually done in the 
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Rotterdam safety monitor). The second reaction may lead to a lower score in the following 
year, which may trigger measures that are not actually warranted by worse performance. (Cf. 
Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002 for similar examples). 
 
Many if not most policy processes are multi-actor in nature because the policy is formulated 
or negotiated in interaction and co-operation between different administrative bodies and lay-
ers, and often also with private and societal organizations. The same holds for many ‘imple-
mentation’ processes. In theses cases, what has been said about third actors above applies in a 
specific way. Like citizens, clients and media co-producers can influence evaluation and will 
react to their outcomes (or not) and thus co-determine the setup, conclusions and impact of 
evaluations. More specifically, in cases of co-production it is not a single actor who defines 
and commissions evaluations. Different actors may do so at the same time, thus producing 
concurring evaluations with potentially contradictory results, which will not necessarily con-
tribute to substantive improvements or better cooperation. An interesting aspect in this con-
nection is the question who initiates an evaluation, along which lines and especially: who is 
evaluated. Even apart from the substantive conclusion of an evaluation these elements may 
strongly influence sensemaking processes of the different actors and hence their reactions. 
 
Dutch spatial developments actually are a co-production of different governmental bodies, 
private enterprises, environmental and other interest groups and citizens. If the central gov-
ernment or the Spatial Planning Bureau commissions an evaluation to assess to what extent 
the general goals formulated in the Spatial Policy Bill are realized, municipalities may experi-
ence this as an effort to increase central control, especially if they are not given the opportu-
nity to insert their goals, limitations and assessments in the evaluation process (see Teisman et 
al. 2002, for a detailed analysis and some options for dealing with these complications).   
 
This theoretical argument gives rise to the presupposition that the design, the outcome and the 
impact of evaluation are products of complex interaction processes in which sensemaking 
from a diversity of perspectives takes place. Then, insight in the relevant repertoires and 
knowledge of the interaction patterns between relevant actors helps to understand the dynam-
ics around evaluations and their impacts. Based on such understanding ideas for more effec-
tive evaluations and evaluation arrangements may be developed. 
    
How to evaluate public management reforms? 
Above, I hypothesized that the relative lack of comprehensive evaluations of NPM reforms is 
due to the self-evidence that their rationales have for their promoters. Of course, from an ‘ex-
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ternal’ perspective, such as developed in this paper, evaluation of NPM reforms as such is 
very desirable. In this section I develop some ideas on what such evaluations might look like. 
The following section is devoted to the question how evaluations of NPM innovations – and 
also evaluations within the framework of NPM practices - can be done in a way that enhances 
utilization of evaluation results and their impact. For both themes I make use of the theoreti-
cal argument developed before.  
 
In de preceding discussion of the dynamics of evaluation I advanced the thesis that actual de-
velopments on the behavioral level (design of the evaluation, steps in the evaluation process, 
and (re)actions in relation to its outcomes) are mediated by sensemaking among actors in-
volved in the consecutive phases. These sensemaking processes are connected to actor reper-
toires and their interaction patterns, hence they will be situation or position or sector specific.  
 This argument is not only relevant for evaluations of management reforms but may 
also be applied to the dynamics of the reforms themselves (cf. Teisman and Van Buren, chap-
ter 11 of this volume). This is relevant in the present context, since it has consequences for the 
way in which evaluations of public management reforms can and should be undertaken. The 
argument runs as follows. 
NPM reforms are designed on the basis of specific rationales (which could, in my lan-
guage, be denoted as repertoires). Their actual shape and their impact on actual behavior, 
however, depends to a large extent on the sense other actors make of the reforms.  This would 
imply that the meaning of such innovations may differ between actors and that their impact 
and ‘success’ is context dependent. To phrase it differently: the effects of an innovation do 
not only depend on characteristics of that innovation, but also – and primarily! – on the mean-
ing it acquires from actors’ perspectives and on the interplay of interpretation related actor 
behaviors. Thus, a typical evaluation question should not be whether new arrangement X is 
‘good’, or ‘better’ than arrangement Y, but how arrangement X works in a specific context5 
and why (see also Pollitt et al 2004). Evaluations should indeed search for explanations of the 
functioning and effects of public management innovations since this may provide new input 
in sensemaking and learning processes, contributing to ideas for improvement. Moreover, the 
analytical argument can potentially be generalized to other settings, which is generally not the 
case for substantive findings. When a successful example of contract management is found 
(irrespective of the criteria that are used to arrive at that judgment), a key question should be 
what conditions and mechanisms produced that result. Insights like these are necessary  to be 
able to link evaluation results to other settings.  
                                                     
5 What the specific context is, is not trivial either. Actors may have different perceptions of or convic-
tions about what the relevant context is. 
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 The theoretical approach advanced in this paper also implies that knowledge of the 
perspectives (repertoires) of actors involved (in whatever role) as well as of their interactions 
is necessary for explanations to be found. Therefore, interviews with actors in different roles 
and positions – or other forms of their participation in the evaluation process – are required to 
reconstruct their repertoires and be able to explain their (re)actions and thereby the function-
ing and eventual effects of the management structure or strategy under review. It should be 
noted that this thesis is not based on a normative choice for democracy or empowerment 
(however honorable such a choice would be) but on an analytical argument on the dynamics 
of evaluation and public management innovations.  
It should also be noted that involvement of stakeholders in the evaluation process 
may influence and enhance the impact of the evaluation since participants are more aware of 
the fact that there is an evaluation. Therefore, they may be more inclined to acquire knowl-
edge on its content and conclusions,  to recognize more elements, and to feel more committed 
to act upon the evaluation outcomes. In fact, resulting changes in actor sensemaking and be-
havior may also influence the functioning and effects of the public management innovation(s) 
under scrutiny. The direction of these changes depends on how evaluation results and other 
experiences in the evaluation process are linked by actors to their existing ideas and practices 
(Van der Meer 1999). That’s why the idea that participation produces support seems to be too 
simplistic, both with respect to the evaluation process and with respect to the public manage-
ment innovation evaluated. It is quite conceivable that a negative attitude towards a public 
management innovation is reinforced or induced in the process for some actors. And even if 
actors’ attitudes change in a positive direction the question remains exactly what it is that thet 
support: their (changed) image of what the innovation is about is decisive. 
Thus, although I have argued that some form of interaction with stakeholders in the 
evaluation is required for sensible evaluation of public management innovations, it should be 
realized that in doing so the object of investigation might change. Or, to put if differently, the 
evaluation process becomes an integral part of the functioning of the innovation. 
 
Towards effective evaluation 
The ideas on the dynamics of evaluation outlined above, also provide clues to improve the 
efficacy of evaluations, both of and in NPM innovations. The first question here is: how can 
we define and assess the effectiveness of evaluations? A number of levels of impact come to 
mind (cf. Hupe and Van der Meer 2002, 14): 
1. actors evaluated and other stakeholders take note of the evaluation; 
2. actors use evaluation results in considering changes in policy, management, working 
processes, etc.; 
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3. actors support the conclusions of an evaluation; and 
4. actual changes in policy (implementation) or management as suggested by the evaluation. 
However, on reflection this scheme is  problematic.  
 First, although condition 1 seems to be valid on the level of the network as a whole – 
it is a necessary condition for any impact to materialize – it is not so at the level of individual 
actors. Through chains of interactions in the network the behavior of some actors may 
change, partly as a consequence of the evaluation, without these actors having any knowledge 
of the evaluation (indirect impact). 
 Second, level 4 may come about as a consequence of other processes than the evalua-
tion. In fact it is generally very difficult to attribute actual changes to a single cause or even to 
estimate the contribution of a give cause. 
Finally, levels 3 and 4 are not necessarily higher or better than level 2. Criteria, con-
clusion and recommendations given in an evaluation reflect, as I suggested above, in part a 
specific perspective or repertoire. Thus, evaluation results or other experiences in the evalua-
tion process may acquire other meanings for other actors, making sense utilizing their own 
repertoire. Although the evaluators may judge this negatively, from any other stance it may be 
considered a potential contribution to new ideas, new innovations and hence learning. 
Therefore, my thesis is that the only general criterion for effectiveness  of evaluation 
is the extent to which it contributes to learning processes in the network of relevant ac-
tors/stakeholders. The extent to which this is the case can be related to the number or the di-
versity of actors learning (or reporting to learn) something from the evaluation, or to the 
measure to which new concepts or ‘facts’ from the evaluation are used in consecutive dis-
course. ‘Learning’ might also be measured by the extent to which actors attribute actual 
changes - or decisions not to change - to the evaluation or to concepts and ‘facts’ produced by 
the evaluation. Finally, learning can be measured by the extent to which evaluations trigger 
interaction and debate in the network. 
One could point to the fact that many evaluations, especially in the context of NPM, 
do not primarily aim at learning, but rather at control and accountability (see Sanderson 2001, 
on this distinction; Teisman and Van der Meer 2002). However true that may be, my argu-
ment would be that the efficacy of accountability oriented evaluation depends on the extent to 
which and the way in which it is include in sensemaking processes of and among actors in-
volved. If no actor reads something new in the evaluation, if its results are no object of debate 
and if no decisions (not) to change behavior can be related to the evaluation, the evaluation 
has not been effective. 
 
Thus, the key question becomes how learning from evaluation can be enhanced (Cf. Thoenig 
2003).  
 13
 The theoretical argument in this paper suggests that at least some actors should both 
recognize the evaluation (outcomes) as sensible from their existing repertoire and as new. If 
the first condition is not met, the evaluation is simply noise to them, if the second is not met, 
there is nothing to be learned (except the fact that there is nothing to be learned, which con-
solidates existing repertoires and may decrease opportunities for future learning). The ‘con-
nectivity’ of evaluations – the extent to which they are connectable to existing repertoires of 
different actors, thus inserting new element in these – depends on both their contents and the 
interaction processes in which they are embedded. Actors commissioning or performing 
evaluations can enhance connectivity by gaining knowledge of actor repertoires, related pre-
occupations, dominant questions etc., to which the evaluation design can be adapted. Alterna-
tively they can involve second and third actors in the process of designing the evaluation.  
 It should be realized that the preconditions for connectivity and learning are generally 
different for different actors, since their repertoires and positions in interaction patterns differ. 
By consequence, it will not be possible to design evaluations that maximize learning for all 
actors at the same time. Actors have different interests and questions. Especially in the case of 
co-productive or participative policy processes, actors should be allowed, enabled and stimu-
lated to perform or commission their own evaluations, thus feeding their own learning proc-
esses. This may also reduce perverse behavior or defensive reactions (however these may be 
defined).  
 But it should also be realized that policy and management results eventually are pro-
duced in the interplay between all actors. If evaluation is to stimulate and improve their coop-
eration, it should also help their mutual debate and collective learning processes (Gray and 
Jenkins 2003). Efforts should therefore be undertaken to enable linking of and confrontation 
between different evaluations, done by different actors at different levels, and to supplement 
them with joint (multi-actor) evaluations (Teisman et al. 2002; Van der Meer and Edelenbos 
2006). In the latter case collective learning and mutual cooperation can already take place in 
the design phase of the evaluation. 
 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper I dealt with some issues concerning evaluation of and in NPM innovations. 
Evaluations in support of accountability constitute a core element of NPM philosophy and 
arrangements. Still they may have unintended and even perverse effects. It was also observed 
that NPM arrangements as such are far less systematically evaluated. To explain this state of 
affairs and to develop directions of improvement, I proposed a theoretical framework in 
which  
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  ‘sensemaking’, interaction and ‘repertoires’ are the core concepts. By conceiving of evalua-
tion as a sensemaking process in interaction between actors in a network, both the design and 
the impact of evaluations can be explained (as well as the lack of evaluation or the lack of 
impact). Moreover the argument gave rise to some ideas about shaping evaluations of public 
management innovations as such. These can be summarized as follows: 
• the success and impacts of public management innovations are not only determined by 
characteristics of the innovation; evaluations should therefore be contextualized; 
• evaluations of public management innovations should include (context dependent) ex-
planations for their functioning and effects, both for context related learning and for 
generalization to other contexts; 
• these explanations require knowledge of actor repertoires, which implies some sort of 
participation of key actors and stakeholders in the evaluation process; and 
• evaluation of NPM innovations influence the functioning and impact of these innova-
tion, i.e. evaluation becomes part of the innovation. 
Finally I derived some conclusions with respect to enhancing efficacy of evaluations (both of 
and in public management innovations): 
• learning is the only general criterion for evaluation effectiveness; 
• connectivity of evaluations in relation to actor repertoires determines their learning po-
tential. Thus enhancing evaluation efficacy requires enhancing connectivity which in 
turn requires interaction with stakeholders; and 
• since different actors have different repertoires and learning needs, a multiplicity of 
evaluations should be favored, performed by different actors, at different levels and with 
different core questions. However these evaluations should have enough connectivity to 
contribute to mutual debate and cooperation. Also multi-actor evaluations should be an 
element of the set of evaluations in a network. 
Now, a focus on learning and actor involvement in the learning process is not new in the 
world of evaluation. On normative grounds or just to enhance utilization diverse forms of par-
ticipative evaluations have been developed (Stake, 1983;  Guba and Lincoln 1989; Cousins 
and Earl 1992;  Abma 1996; Patton 1997; Preskill and Torres 1999; Van der Meer and 
Edelenbos 2006). However, the rationales of these forms of evaluation seem to have been 
seen as incongruent with the NPM paradigm for long. Still, gradually new connections be-
tween these different ‘repertoires’ seem to come into being, especially in situations in which 
the fact that policy outcomes result from the interplay between many actors cannot be missed 
(Teisman and Van der Meer 2002). For example, the authors in a volume edited by Gray et al. 
(2003) struggle with the role of evaluation in collaborative arrangements. On the one hand 
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there is a felt need for assessment of results of collaboration and of the success of collabora-
tive arrangements by means of ‘objective’ and independent measuring, on the other hand the 
necessity to explicitly involve the actors in the network is underlined, although not all contri-
butions are clear about what their roles should be. The framework proposed in the present 
chapter may help in this respect.  
To be sure, further research is needed to test the theoretical notions advanced in this chapter, 
especially their application to NPM innovations and related evaluations. Also the recommen-
dations should be tested and evaluated in their own right. This chapter intended to provide a 
framework and some first steps to perform such research and to arrive at evaluations that 
more effectively support the process of learning by experience on an organization and net-
work level. 
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